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THE CHARTER AND PUBLICLY ASSISTED HOUSING
Linda Gehrke*
This article is an attempt to address, in an introductory way, the
issues of whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(the Charter) creates a positive right to shelter (section 7); and
whether section 15 of the Charter protects public housing tenants
from discrimination, or leaves publicly assisted housing programs
open to attack.
Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948
defines "security of the person" as:
"Every one has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and
of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care and necessary social services, and the
right to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, or other lack
of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control."
Section 7 of the Charter provides the right to security of the
person as follows:
"Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except
in accordance
with
the principles
of
fundamental justice."
Section 15 of the Charter provides equality rights as follows:
"15.() Every individual is equal before and under the
law and has the right to the equal protection and equal
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based on race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or
mental or physical disability.
Linda Gehrke is senior staff lawyer at Jane-Finch Community
Legal Services.
For a more detailed (but less recent)
examination by her of the same topic, see her article in the
Statute Audit conducted by the Charter of Rights Education
Fund.
c 1985 Copyright in this article remains with the
author.
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It might be argued that Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 1948, which provides for a right to housing, ought to
be read into section 7 of the Charter since the Declaration is
regarded as a part of the law of the United Nations and
international law.
A right to shelter would require the state to provide shelter as a
part of "security of the person". This position goes beyond the
Federal and Provincial Legislatures' present duty to provide
housing under the National Housing Act (Canada), the Ontario
Housing Development Act and the Ontario Housing Corporation
Act. These acts enable government to fund and provide publicly
assisted housing for low income families. They do not, however,
create a positive duty to provide publicly assisted housing to all
those in need.
Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is regarded as
international law, it is not a legally binding instrument as such.
This Declaration was converted into two conventions - the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
the International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social
Rights (ICECSR). ! The right to shelter is an "economic right" and
falls under the International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and
Social Rights. The ICECSR appears to be meant to be progressively
implemented. Although it recognizes the right to "an adequate
standard of living" including adequate housing, it does not appear
to place a positive duty on governments to provide such an
adequate standard of living. It has been argued that the ICECSR
may not create positive rights; but in section 15 Charter
arguments, where discrimination occurs with respect to ICECSR
rights, the ICECSR may be used as an indication of the importance2
of the individual right which has been affected by government.
Thus, the right to housing enumerated in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic and
Social Rights might be read into the rights protected from discrimination by section 15 of the Charter.
As well, it can be argued on the basis of the case of Re Webb and
OHC 3 that subsidized shelter is viewed by Canadian courts as a
"benefit" that ought to be protected from discrimination by section
15(l) of the Charter, which provides for equal benefit of the law.
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The Charter and Publicly Assisted Housing
The enumerated grounds for discrimination under section 15 are
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or
physical disability. They do not include discrimination on the basis
of economic or social status. However, it can be argued that the
word "discrimination" in section 15 is not limited to the
enumerated grounds.
The Ontario Human Rights Code, 1981
prohibits discrimination in housing accomodation based on receipt
of public assistance, clearly recognizing an economic or social
status ground of discrimination. Thus, denial of publicly assisted
housing on the basis of race or sex is likely to be an infringement
of the section 15 right to equal benefit of the law; and denial of
housing on the basis of economic or social status is arguably an
infringement of section 15.
An attack on publicly assisted housing programs because they
discriminate on the ground of economic status (wealth) would
hopefully be thwarted by section 15(2) of the Charter, which
provides for affirmative action programs whose object is the
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals. Section
15(2) appears also to protect publicly assisted housing programs
from attack on the basis that they primarily house families headed
by single mothers, 4 since women, particularly elderly widows and
single mothers,
have been shown by statistics to be disadvantaged
5
groups.
In R. v. Videoflicks, 6 the Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that it
is the "effect" or "adverse impact" of impugned legislation which is
most important in the interpretation of the Charter.
Thus,
discrimination would include discrimination not only by intent or
purpose, but also by adverse impact on disadvantaged groups. The
adverse impact analysis is very important for the advancing of the
interests of women, visible minorities and the disabled.
The Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society 7 case (OFAVAS)
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raises interesting possibilities for challenging discriminatory housing policies. In the OFAVAS case the Divisional Court (affirmed by
the Ontario Court of Appeal held that where the standards used by
the Ontario Board of Censors to censor films were not prescribed
by statute or regulation, but were left to the discretion of the
Board, the limitation on freedom of expression imposed by the
legislation cannot be permitted by operation of section 1 of the
Charter. The rationale of the decision is that a limitation left to
administrative discretion, whether or not reasonable, is not one
prescribed by law.
In the case of OHC, eligibility for housing is not set out in the
statutes or regulations, except to enable governments to provide
publicly assisted housing for low income families. 8 Thus, OHC
eligibility policies which discriminate against disadvantaged groups
by adverse impact or otherwise may ultimately be struck down as
being limitations to the right to equal benefit of the law which are
not "prescribed by law".
There may be discrimination on the face of housing legislation on
the ground of family status. Although not an enumerated ground in
s. 15(1) of the Charter, marital status is a ground for discrimination in the Ontario Human Rights Code, 1981.
OHC policies which discriminate on enumerated grounds in the
provision of publicly subsidized housing (for example, more
stringent eligibility requirements for sponsored immigrants or the
disabled) might be challenged under section 15; it might also be
argued that OHC policies fail to meet the section 1 Charter test of
being "prescribed by law", on the reasoning adopted by the Ontario
Court of Appeal in the OFAVAS case. Policies which are not
discriminatory on their face but discriminate by adverse effect
may be challenged, based on the reasoning in the Videoflicks case.
Policies which discriminate on enumerated grounds (race, sex,
disability) would make stronger cases for challenge than
discrimination on non-enumerated grounds (status). As well, it may
be worthwhile to consider whether paragraph 36(l)(a) of the
Charter which provides a commitment to promoting equal
opportunities for the well-being of Canadians can be argued in
support of expenditures for publicly assisted housing projects.
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